The Bible Made Impossible: An Exchange

Robert Gundry's critical response to my The Bible Made Impossible ["Smithereens!", September/October] fails in a variety of ways. On the positive side, Gundry did a better job of summarizing the first half of my book than any critical review so far; and some of his doubts about christocentric hermeneutics I think are worth considering. But as a whole it is an unimpressive review. Understanding why requires a bit of background on the book.

The first half of my book argues that biblicism, a widespread theory about how the Bible should function as an authority, is impossible. If biblicist theory is correct, I argue, then it should produce (particularly among those who hold it) a largely shared understanding of what Scripture teaches, an interpretive convergence, especially on central theological matters. But, as a matter of empirical fact, biblicism produces nothing of the sort; instead, American evangelicalism embodies a pervasive interpretive pluralism in biblical interpretation and theology. I further argue that none of the possible biblicist explanations of this pluralism succeeds in salvaging biblicism. They may work to explain pluralism, but in so doing they undermine biblicism itself, since the explanations are incompatible with key biblicist beliefs. I conclude, therefore, that biblicism is impossible, because the real world of biblical practice contradicts it, reflecting interpretive theological outcomes that should not exist if biblicism were possible. In this I am simply saying what I think is patently obvious.

The second half of my book then shifts to suggesting numerous possible constructive ideas for people who recognize biblicism's impossibility. I make three disclaimers: that these ideas are relevant only if the argument of the first half of the book works; that I do not think they are complete, sufficient, or infallible; and that they ought not to divert attention from the critical first part of the book.

The glaring flaw in Gundry's review is that it simply dismisses the central argument of the first half of my book without ever actually engaging and responding to it. He rejects my critical case literally without explaining what is wrong with it. Despite my clarity that the first half of the book is what matters most, and that the second half is contingent, Gundry spends a mere six sentences in his entire review (beginning with "for that matter" and ending with "unvarnished authority") seemingly addressing my main argument. Comparatively, he devotes 16 paragraphs—nearly all of his critical words—to disapproving of one thematic proposal among many in the second half of my book.

I think Gundry's critical case against christological hermeneutics is well worth pondering. But the crucial fact is that just because Gundry does not like a certain proposed response to biblicism's fatal problems does not make those problems go away. If someone has cancer, a physician claiming that a particular treatment will not help does not make the cancer disappear. Pervasive interpretive pluralism unmasks biblicism's impossibility. Gundry seems to hope that by poking holes in one proposed response to that problem, the problem itself will vanish. Furthermore, the christocentric proposal that Gundry is so intent on refuting is only even relevant if my more basic critique of biblicism is valid. Gundry seems to think it is not (though without explaining how or why). But that makes irrelevant his long drilling into my christological proposal. Why so persistently attack a suggested response to a problem when you don't even believe the problem exists?

What about Gundry's six sentences that appear to address the problem of pervasive interpretive pluralism? They actually don't. In one sentence Gundry expresses a doubt that biblicism "requires uniformity" in biblical interpretation (putting the word "uniformity" into my mouth, by the way, an extreme standard I never propose). But then Gundry never actually explains how or why biblicism as I describe it could reasonably expect to produce or accommodate pervasive interpretive pluralism. If Gundry actually had such an explanation, it could have spoken directly to my central argument and would been very helpful to offer. Instead, he simply changes the question by asserting that multivocality and pluralism are everywhere in the Christian tradition. But we are not talking about the entire Christian tradition. We are talking about biblicism. It is biblicists who make strong claims that are incompatible with pervasive interpretive pluralism; most of the other traditions do not, or have very different ways to deal with pluralism.

Nothing is gained in the larger argument by his diversionary move. In the last sentence, Gundry then focuses his thoughts on the specific matter of "seeming contradictions" in the Bible—a more narrow concern than the vast pervasive interpretive pluralism my book highlights—and offers his own preferred solution to it, which seems to have little to do with my book. In short, in the few sentences that appear to address my most important argument, Gundry merely breezes by with a few undeveloped and irrelevant thoughts.

Gundry's review also repeatedly misrepresents my tone and claims. For example, of the constructive proposals suggested in the second half of the book, I say plainly that they are "tentative," "limited, partial, and fallible," yet "worth consideration." I am clear that they "do not offer a fixed package of solutions," are not a "comprehensive program to rehabilitate" biblicism, and that my purpose "is not to resolve all of the problems" but merely to suggest "only possible partial contributions to what will have to be a larger reworking" of evangelicals' approach to scripture (pp. 95-97, 177-178). I actually suggest that a 20-year discussion about these matters is likely necessary to sort out the difficult issues. In Gundry's hands, however, I come off as thinking that I have the solution to fix biblicism. "How then does Smith propose to solve the problem?" he asks, reducing my complex set of proposals developed over three chapters to four simple ideas described in one long sentence. That sets him up to then ask, "But will these maneuvers work to solve the problem?" Of course not, he decides. Gundry thus represents me as trying to do things I explicitly deny trying to do and them slams me for not doing them.

That is not the only misrepresentation. Gundry falsely claims that I argue that the Bible "speaks authoritatively only on salvation in Christ and topics related to that salvation." He wrongly suggests that I agree with Don Carson that simply "better exegesis" will solve the problem of interpretive pluralism. He repeatedly raises the issue of whether the Bible has "errors," when I in fact clearly separate my argument from the inerrancy debate. And where my case is appropriately nuanced and qualified, Gundry unfailingly misconstrues that as signs of inconsistency and contradiction (e.g., "he backtracks," Smith "himself gives ground," "Smith doesn't like prooftexting except when … ," and "as he unconsciously admits").

Gundry's review embodies other confusions. He reveals a simplistic outlook, for example, when he fails to distinguish different kinds of pluralism operating in very different types of ecclesial systems. He seems to think, for instance, that since various Catholic theologians and laypeople disagree about a lot of things, then Catholicism as a tradition suffers from the same pervasive interpretive pluralism that evangelical biblicists do—which is nonsense—and consequently that my critique of biblicism somehow goes up in smoke. Gundry is here forcing very different kinds of Christian experiences and paradigms into the evangelical one with which he is most familiar. Gundry's pushback on christocentric hermeneutics in a Barthian mode (his sixth paragraph) I think reveals mostly that he does not understand what such a hermeneutic would look like and how it would work. If Gundry was actually interested in how Karl Barth might help us today, he should seriously read Barth's Church Dogmatics instead of relying on recollections of lectures from five decades ago. There is no substitute for engaging a scholar's mature, published work. Gundry also cutely tries to pin Scottish commonsense realism back on me, but his argument only shows that he does not understand the philosophy of science well enough to distinguish other alternatives, like critical realism, that make a big difference in these matters. If all Gundry can recognize is one variety of realism (i.e., Scottish commonsense), that is his problem, not a defect in my book's argument.

A good critical response to my book would, by the very logic of its argument, have to do one or more of the following. First, it might show that biblicism is in fact not widespread in American evangelicalism. Second, it might show that evangelicalism is empirically not characterized by pervasive interpretive pluralism. Third, it might show that biblicism in fact need not produce fairly convergent readings of the Bible. Fourth, it might show that one or another possible explanation of pluralism offered in fact successfully rescues biblicism from pervasive interpretive pluralism. Gundry does none of these. The first and second would require taking leave of reality. The third and fourth might be accomplished, but, so far as I can see, only by eliminating key parts of biblicism that would turn it into a non-biblicist theory and practice. Gundry apparently thinks the third move is possible. But, again, he never bothers to show us how or why. He is too busy running down the idea of a christocentric reading of Scripture (which, curiously, nearly every other evangelical critic of my books has claimed they obviously believe in and practice regularly).

To summarize, Gundry dismisses The Bible Made Impossible without answering its central challenge. He is caught up criticizing one theme in the secondary part of the book, distracting readers from the main event. And he misrepresents and confuses a number of basic points of my argument. In short, it's a bad and disappointing review that does not accomplish its aims. In the end, my original argument stands: biblicism of the kind I describe is in fact real, widespread, influential, and, yes, impossible.

Christian Smith
William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Sociology
Director of the Center for the Study of Religion and Society
University of Notre Dame
South Bend, Indiana

Robert Gundry responds:

The mainly ad hominem character of Christian Smith's comments initially posted on the website of Books & Culture led me at that time to decline an offer to respond. Now that he has replied substantively in the main, I venture a response but also urge readers to peruse his book, my review of it, his reply to the review, and my present response all in conjunction with each other.

In my review of The Bible Made Impossible I stated outright, "Smith has justifiably brought to the fore a problem in pervasive interpretive pluralism [from here on PIP]." Does that statement look as though I "don't even believe the problem exists"? I followed up by observing—against Smith's treatment of PIP as a distinctively fatal flaw in biblicism—that "this problem plagues all literature, not just the Bible as perceived by biblicists." Supported earlier in some detail, does that observation (among others) look as though I "reject[ed]" Smith's "critical case literally without explaining what is wrong with it"?

Smith rejects biblicists' belief in biblical clarity but refers to the "clarity" of his book. So are we to believe in the clarity of The Bible Made Impossible but not in that of the Bible itself? If Smith thinks I and others have variously misinterpreted his book, then PIP plagues the book and by his own standard renders it impossible along with the Bible. Doubtless he would nuance what he means by the clarity of his book, but so too do biblicists in regard to the Bible's clarity.

If biblicism has failed to "produce … a largely shared understanding of what scripture teaches," how can Smith speak as he does of "American evangelicalism"? Doesn't the phenomenon of American evangelicalism, which is just as "patently obvious" as is PIP, imply a largely shared understanding of what Scripture teaches despite numerous disagreements? If Smith won't give that much ground, he'll have to denude American evangelicalism even of its doctrinal underwear and treat the phenomenon in nondoctrinal terms alone. What then makes evangelicals evangelicals?

Smith complains that I paid a disproportionately small amount of attention to the evidence he cited for PIP in American evangelicalism, and a disproportionately large amount of attention to his proposed solutions to the problem of PIP. Guilty as charged! But unrepentant, because I accept the problem's actuality (and said so). Other biblicists accept it, too. Smith even cites some to that effect. Besides, what's there to say about his long inventories of slogans on automobile bumper stickers and T-shirts, titles of both popular and serious Christian books, evangelical institutions, quotations of their doctrinal statements, doctrinal disagreements, multiple interpretations of the same scriptural passage? Evidence of PIP? Yes, of course. So I was, and am, more interested in Smith's proposed solutions to the problem of PIP.

True, Smith proposes solutions "tentative[ly]" and for the sake of a long-running discussion. So given my stated acknowledgment of PIP, I hoped that my criticisms of those solutions would be taken as part of the discussion rather than as evasions of the problem. And the heaviness of my criticisms should have kept Smith from thinking I wrongly suggested he agrees with Don Carson that better scriptural exegesis is needed to solve the problem. If those criticisms weren't enough, my suggestion, "[M]aybe someone should write a book arguing that pervasive pluralism in biblical interpretation is due to the lingering deleterious effects, even on biblicists, of nonbiblicism in the past"—this suggestion should have ensured that the immediately preceding "Indeed" declared my agreement with Carson rather than Smith's agreement with him.

As to "multivocality and pluralism … everywhere in the Christian tradition," Smith says "we are not talking about the entire Christian tradition. We are talking about biblicism." But despite acknowledging PIP in the entire Christian tradition, he does call on that tradition to help solve the problem of PIP as regards the Bible.

Incidentally, I did not rely "on recollections of [Karl Barth's] lectures from five decades ago" (emphasis added). As stated in my review, I sat in the late Barth's "seminars," which consisted in free-flowing discussions of Church Dogmatics (what Smith calls Barth's "mature, published work"); and I wrote up an evaluation, quoted only partially in my review, the very next academic term (in early 1961, Barth's death coming not long afterward in 1968). In my rejection of Barthianism I wasn't "running down" the idea as such of a christocentric reading of Scripture. Instead, and given the plurality of Christologies proffered throughout church history, I was running down the adequacy of a christocentric reading as a solution to the problem of PIP. I even emphasized biblicists' liking of a christocentric reading, as in their "relishing typological, especially christologically typological, … meanings of the Old Testament" (emphasis original).

I've long been well-acquainted with critical realism, thank you; but Smith needs to tell us how the method he used to construct his critique of biblicism differs from the Scottish commonsense realism which, he argues, contributed mightily to the error of biblicism.

I leave it to readers of Books & Culture and The Bible Made Impossible to judge for themselves whether my review misrepresented Smith in other respects as well as in the ones noted above.

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