How to review for readers of Books & Culture two very fine exegetical commentaries on the New Testament epistle to the Hebrews (if it is indeed an epistle rather than a homily onto which an epistolary ending has been tacked)? That is a question. For modern readers of Hebrews find it difficult to understand. At least they say so. Despite their scholarly expertise, even the authors of the commentaries under review—one a Roman Catholic (Luke Timothy Johnson) and the other an evangelical Anglican (Peter T. O'Brien)—describe Hebrews as filled with difficulties, and then proceed to resolve them in great detail.

O'Brien attributes the difficulties mainly to Hebrews' method of argumentation, a mixture of typology and exhortation; Johnson mainly to the strangeness of Hebrews' worldview as compared with that of most moderns. So O'Brien pays a lot of attention to structural analyses, while Johnson waxes genuinely eloquent in his description of Hebrews as contradicting most moderns' practical atheism, moral tolerance, and cushy intolerance of pain and suffering, all of which contradictions make it hard for them to understand—and even harder for them to accept—the truth or relevance of Hebrews' unseen realm of spirits, moral stringency, and discussion of religious sacrifice. At times Johnson himself seems cagey on these matters, though, as when he writes that "the devil stands for the cosmic forces opposed to the righteous" (only stands for?), ascribes immortality to the angels "in the tradition" (but not in fact?), treats God's wrath as "anthropomorphic" (therefore not actually divine?), and calls the "mystery" of Christian faith "enchanting" (rather than objectively true?).

While such language leaves a reader uncertain of Johnson's belief, or unbelief, in the reality of a personal devil, of angelic creatures, of divine wrath, and in the historical solidity of Christian faith, the reader must laud the acuity with which he pinpoints contrasts between the worldviews of Hebrews and moderns, including many professing Christians. It needs saying, though, that the majority of Christians, who now live in the two-thirds world and elsewhere in evangelicaldom (including Pentecostalism), have their worldview shaped in significant measure by Hebrews and the rest of the New Testament. When it comes to numbers, then, perhaps a social location outside these circles has led Johnson to overstate the contrasts.

Out of these commentaries' welter of exegetical details, buttressed by both text-critical notes and (especially in O'Brien's commentary) documentary footnotes, I've chosen to highlight three overarching questions: the first one theologically philosophical, the second one theologically psychological, the third one theologically political.

Question #1 (theologically philosophical): Does the theology of Hebrews rest on Platonism, as do the writings of the first-century Alexandrian Jewish philosopher Philo? Though allowing for Platonic "terminology" in Hebrews 8:5; 9:23-24; 10:1; 12:27-28, O'Brien pronounces Hebrews "not Philonic or Platonic." Quite the reverse in the case of Johnson. Though allowing for a christianizing of Platonic philosophy in Hebrews, he pronounces that philosophy foundational to Hebrews' theology. How so? Well, Hebrews describes the Mosaic tabernacle and the sacrifices offered there as earthly copies and shadows of God's heavenly sanctuary, where he took satisfaction in Christ's sacrificial death. According to Johnson, this description rests on Plato's contrast between the phenomenal world of material objects and the noumenal world of ideal forms. More particularly, "the one" of each ideal form (for example, that of a chair) is expressed in "the many" of material objects corresponding to the ideal form (for example, dining chairs, lounging chairs, rocking chairs, et al.). Just as multiplicity, change, and perishability characterize Plato's phenomenal world, so multiplicity, change, and perishability are seen according to Hebrews not only in the line of many prophets who spoke the word of the Lord to Israel but also in the succession of many priests who officiated at the Mosaic tabernacle and in the many sacrifices offered there. And just as singularity, immutability, and eternality characterize Plato's noumenal world, so too in Hebrews' portrayal of God, his heaven, and the once-for-all sacrificial death of Christ. But since the immaterial world of Platonic ideal forms is nonspatial, nondimensional, and nontemporal, Hebrews' heaven is, according to Johnson, the nonspatial, nondimensional, and nontemporal presence of God. "Salvation, therefore, is … transtemporal because also transmaterial," and "the [inhabited] world to come" is to be taken "not in the sense of the empirical cosmos, but in the sense of the realm of the divine presence." One thinks of Gertrude Stein's observation concerning Oakland, California: "There's no there there."

To be sure, Johnson tempers Hebrews' Platonism by calling it "a hybrid of Platonic metaphysics [ideal forms as distinct from their material expressions] and Semitic cosmology [heaven as distinct from earth]," so that "Hebrews appreciates rather than deprecates the physical" because of God's having created it. Similarly, in Hebrews "the contrast between type [the noumenal] and antitype [the phenomenal] is spelled out in terms of the past and present, with the present being the more perfect expression." That is to say, Hebrews presents an eschatology. Well, then, this eschatology must stop short at the end of present time; for in Johnson's view the coming world of Hebrews belongs to God's timeless eternity, in which there are no material objects. So does "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday and today and forever [literally, 'unto the ages']" (Heb. 13:8) confine "forever" within the bounds of present time? But "unto the ages" seems to rule out any such confinement; and in the Greek of 2:5 the feminine gender of "the inhabited … that's coming" (usually translated "the world to come" despite the masculine gender of "world" in Greek) calls for supplying the feminine noun "earth." So Hebrews adds terra firma to endless temporality for what obtains in eternity. Only thus do "the resurrection of the dead" (6:2) and "a better resurrection" (11:35) have purpose. For the very word "resurrection" means a live "standing up" of formerly supine corpses and therefore requires a spatial and timeful new heavens and new earth for their environment.[1] Moreover, though the Mosaic law featured an earthly "shadow" and "copy" of "good" and "heavenly things," these heavenly things were "to come" (see 10:1 with 8:5; 9:23-24). So the earthly shadow was a fore-shadow, and the earthly copy wasn't of an already existing heavenly reality—rather, the pattern for a future heavenly reality, the translation "copy" being misleading therefore. So the palm goes to O'Brien for his denial of Platonism in Hebrews, though he falls somewhat short of a convincing argument to support the denial and adopts the misleading translation "copy."

Question #2 (theologically psychological): Does Hebrews warn Christian believers against the possibility of forfeiting their salvation, so that they can have no assurance of it? In the first place, and as noted by both O'Brien and Johnson, the recipients of Hebrews are addressed as true Christians: "holy brothers and sisters," "sharers of a heavenly calling," "those who have once been enlightened and tasted of the heavenly gift and become partakers of the Holy Spirit and tasted the good word of God and the powers of the age to come." (Tasting and partaking are to be weakened in meaning no more than in the case of Jesus' "tast[ing] death" and "partak[ing] of blood and flesh.")

In the second place, and again as noted by both O'Brien and Johnson, Hebrews repeatedly warns these Christians against apostatizing, which Johnson correctly defines as "a deliberate choice not to participate in the gift once given," and therefore as distinct from Christians' sins which don't reach that level of intentionality. Third, the contrast with "things containing salvation" indicates damnation as the consequence of apostasy; and both of our commentators recognize that Hebrews announces the impossibility of apostates' restoration through a second repentance—an impossibility that has "often troubled earnest Christians, apparently raising doubts about their assurance of salvation, an assurance that appears to be so clearly affirmed in Romans 5, the 'golden chain' of 8:29-30, and the unqualified promise of John 6:39-40, 44" (so O'Brien), and an impossibility that "the Novatians ['in third-century North Africa'] cited … as a basis for the refusal to readmit those who had caved in under persecution" (so Johnson):

Here is one more way in which the author's perspective—and that of a considerable part of the ancient church—seems far away from that of present-day readers, for whom the very concept of "apostasy" appears strange, and who consider themselves to live in a world in which everything can be forgiven. When the very reality of sin has been reduced to a form of sickness or inadequacy … [so Johnson again].

On the other hand, the author of Hebrews is "convinced of better things" concerning his audience, because "God is not unjust so as to forget [their] work, even the love that [they] have exhibited for his name by having served the saints and continuing to serve them" (6:9-10). So Hebrews' combination of fearsome warning and confident encouragement presents a psychological conundrum. Johnson refers to "this hypothetical apostasy." Does "hypothetical" then emasculate the warning in favor of the encouragement, perhaps out of an underlying belief in universal salvation ("Distinctively … , Hebrews extends 'the others,' in behalf of whom Jesus died, to 'everyone' "; and "God's intention … is to draw all other humans into that same transcendent sphere [of his presence]")? This possibility crossed my mind; but I refrain from making an assertion, because Johnson's statements can be read nonuniversalistically so far as the actuality of salvation is concerned.

To O'Brien's credit, he distinguishes between "genuine faith," which "perseveres," and "false faith," which, "regardless of its early signs of life, does not [persevere]." I just wish he had pressed the point that given the limitation of human observation to outward appearance (1 Sam. 16:7) and the outward Christian appearance of Hebrews' addressees at the time of writing, the epistle's author had to treat them as faithful Christians but at the same time take into account the danger of a faith not yet discernible as false. Under this consideration careless Christians should lose their assurance of salvation while conscientious ones should retain it.

Question #3 (theologically political): Does Hebrews teach that the church has superseded Israel, so that from a Christian standpoint Israel deserves no preferential treatment in current global politics? O'Brien stresses that according to Hebrews, "the law of Moses," and hence "the law-covenant," has been abrogated "in its entirety" because "the Aaronic priesthood has been superseded." Now an abrogation of the Mosaic covenant can be understood, and has been understood, to entail not only a permanent replacement of the Mosaic law but also a permanent replacement of ethnic Israel as God's people with the multiethnic church. O'Brien doesn't explicitly affirm such an expanded supersessionism. Much less does he draw from it a political implication. But many do affirm it, and have drawn from it the political implication that ethnic Israel does not deserve preferential treatment in the field of international politics. For this theological reason as well as for what is considered just and right, support goes to the cause of Palestinians over against the Israelis' cause. Amillennialists, who regard the millennium in Revelation 20:1-6 as figurative of the present age featuring the church as Israel's permanent replacement, can easily take this position. Historical premillennialists, too, may take it; for though believing in a future millennium, they don't see ethnic Israel as restored during it.

Dispensational premillennialists do see such a restoration during the millennium, however, and consequently oppose supersessionism in the long run. If they also believe in a rapture of the church to heaven prior to a future period of special tribulation, they think God will renew his dealings with ethnic Israel just prior to a future millennium, during that tribulation. And despite an abrogation of Mosaic sacrifices according to Hebrews, many of these dispensational premillennialists limit the abrogation to the present church age and see a rebuilding of the Jewish temple and a reinstitution there of Mosaic sacrifices during the coming tribulation and millennium. So while supersessionist in regard to the present, because they believe the church has replaced Israel for the time being, dispensational premillennialists are antisupersessionist in regard to the future, as to a lesser degree are those seemingly few amillennialists who see a future salvation of ethnic Israel in accordance with Romans 11:25-27. Naturally, then, and building on the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948, dispensational premillennialists press their version of antisupersessionism into the service of Christian Zionism.

In another vein and apart from millennial views, feelings of Christian guilt over the Holocaust and over prior persecution of the Jews lead even some supersessionists to give Israelis the benefit of doubt in relation to Palestinians and lead others to renounce supersessionism whatever the political implications. Johnson feels such guilt so deeply that, with an emphasis on Hebrews' nonabrogation of the Abrahamic covenant (note the difference from O'Brien's emphasis on Hebrews' abrogation of the Mosaic covenant), he mounts a full-scale assault on supersessionism. But he doesn't relate his antisupersessionism to current Middle Eastern politics any more than O'Brien does with his supersessionism. Politics aside, then, the theological issue of supersessionism gives Johnson an occasion, consistent with his emphasis on religious experience (as in "the impact of the resurrection experience, by which Jesus' followers experienced him after his death as the powerful and life-giving spirit [1 Cor 15:45]"), to declare that "a Jew standing outside the experience of Jesus as exalted Lord … might with equal legitimacy [to that of those blessed with this experience] reject that redefinition [by Hebrews of the Mosaic covenant]." For Johnson, in other words, experience outranks theology, so that his version of antisupersessionism opens the door to a religious legitimizing of unbelief in Jesus (compare two-covenant theology, according to which Jews needn't become Christians to attain salvation or, more generally, favor with God). No such theological backpedaling for O'Brien, though. He lets Scripture both determine theology and interpret experience. Hurrah for O'Brien!

Robert H. Gundry is Professor Emeritus and Scholar-in-Residence at Westmont College. His Commentary on the New Testament recently appeared under the Hendrickson imprint and is now carried by Baker Academic.

1. The "spiritual body" of which Paul speaks in his discussion of resurrection (1 Cor. 15:42-46) isn't an ethereal body. It's a physical body reanimated by the Spirit of Christ. And the "flesh and blood" that "can't inherit God's kingdom" (1 Cor. 15:50) is the present perishable body, not the imperishable resurrected body.

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