Last September, Washington Post columnist Ezra Klein attended the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association to listen to some presentations and see what (if anything) politicians might learn from political scientists. Reflecting on his time at the conference, Klein offered this endorsement: "As the 24-hour news cycle accelerates into the 1,440-minute news cycle, distracting us with an incessant stream of meaningless one-liners and manufactured outrages, the considered, rigorous, historical examinations favored by political scientists offer an increasingly valuable antidote."

The work of Yale political scientist David Mayhew meets all of Klein's criteria and more. Mayhew's best known work is an extended essay probing the simple but profound thesis that members of Congress are "single-minded seekers of re-election." Perhaps we shouldn't be surprised that his latest book, Partisan Balance, again focuses on a simple notion. Armed with impressive datasets and thoughtful analysis, Mayhew makes the case that our constitutional system usually works the way that we want it to work. The parties and the major elected institutions of government are well-balanced.

These are not conclusions that lead to fireworks. Fox News and MSNBC commentators will not be impressed. But many times we need an esteemed scholar like David Mayhew to put forth the time and effort to ask straightforward but essential questions and test prevailing assumptions. In a study that spans the period from World War II to the end of the George W. Bush presidency, this congressional scholar tests the legitimacy of American governing institutions, asking if the Constitution and the political party system appear to be working toward similar or different ends. Focusing on domestic legislation championed by the president, Mayhew analyzes two original datasets. The first compares the popular vote for the president with the median party vote in the House, Senate, and Electoral College. The second database examines 184 legislative initiatives that represent presidents' greatest domestic political priorities.

Mayhew details his argument well, offers disclaimers and caveats, and elaborates in rich and detailed footnotes that resemble a law review article more than a book inspired by public lectures. The arguments are richly informed by historical analysis that often extends beyond the timeframe of the datasets. The armchair political observer is likely to find the prose slow and meticulous and may find the thesis underwhelming. Do we really need 21 tables, 4 figures, and 397 footnotes to tell us that the U.S. system is balanced? In a word: yes. The book is not a quick or refreshing read, but those willing to devote the effort will be well rewarded.

Mayhew is well respected by his peers, and Partisan Balance reminds the reader why he is such a trusted voice in political science. His well-crafted dataset of presidential initiatives is an impressive feat; the book is likely worth the investment for Table 3.1 and the appendix alone. (I shudder at the thought of how many hours of laborious research were necessary to create this single table.) Mayhew could have chosen an easier route for creating a list of high-profile presidential initiatives, but expedience is not his goal. For example, he measures the level of presidential interest in legislative proposals not by a simple count of how many bills a president requests members of Congress to introduce but by combing through memoirs, media stories, and political science research to gather his data. When asking if a president won or lost a particular legislative battle, Mayhew could have used the time-honored technique of looking at the final roll call vote. He chose a different path, however, using contemporary assessments from the Congressional Quarterly to determine a final verdict on the president's success. As he notes, a simple count of roll call votes and presidential signatures would miss much of the action and likely miscategorize some successes and failures. As those of us who have spent time working in Washington can attest, not all legislative battles end with recorded votes, and many a president has been known to sign a bill into law while figuratively "holding his nose."

The appendix is a wonderful resource on its own, especially for those interested in learning more about presidents in the earlier part of Mayhew's study. A master at "showing his work," Mayhew lists the sources he referenced to create his presidential priorities database and as a result creates a solid list of reputable biographies, memoirs, and historical accounts of each president included in his study. Very few congressional researchers working today would take the time and immense effort to consult so many sources to create a dataset.

Perhaps the greatest strength of this work is Mayhew's willingness to confront conventional wisdom to make his simple but profound argument. He demonstrates that, on balance, the American system of separation of powers is stable; neither major political party has a significant advantage over the other; presidents often (but don't always) succeed with domestic policy; and the House and Senate typically operate by majority rule. When the system veers off course from time to time-such as the imbalanced period before World War I-the response is reform, such as the 17th Amendment and the direct election of senators that tweaked the original outline and helped the system get back in party balance.

Mayhew employs an intriguing mix of methodologies. Much of contemporary political science research is very narrow, focusing on particular aspects of political behavior that can be captured in some fashion with quantitative data. At times the quest for methodological precision and search for suitable data can lead researchers to explore very narrow questions that do little to explain more complicated and significant political phenomena. Mayhew chooses the hardest but ultimately most rewarding path, combining quantitative and qualitative work to test his hypotheses. He spends hours reading accounts of presidential battles with Congress, just as he crafts quantitative measures to test hypotheses. His work is deeply steeped in the congressional literature. In the voluminous footnotes, Mayhew interacts with some of the most important arguments and scholarship in his field, published and unpublished.

The prose offers a surprising and measured humility and cautiousness. In a profession whose members are often known for their arrogance, it is refreshing to read an author who readily admits the limitations and potential shortcomings of his results. Politics is about shades of gray; crafting laws involves a long process with many twists and turns. Many researchers have little patience for navigating such complexities, and few are willing to devote the time and effort to wrestle with the "wrinkles, distortions and the like" that complicate political analysis and require explanation and interpretive caution. Mayhew devotes the time needed to accomplish this task. Indeed, in his desire to be open about possible limitations to his research and counterfactual examples, Mayhew sometimes understates his results.

Although the caution is a refreshing balance to the overly triumphal claims common in the academic enterprise, Mayhew has earned his right to make some bolder claims. In the first chapter he dismisses a line of thought with the statement: "This is a road we do not need to go down. I am engaging here in positive analysis, not normative assessment." I found myself responding: please go down that road for a short while; I want to hear your perspective.

for the few folks who might be lured into purchasing a university press book based on its cover, be warned that the title is somewhat misleading. The book does indeed demonstrate a pattern of "partisan balance" as promised in the title, but it doesn't provide a satisfactory explanation of "why political parties don't kill the U.S. Constitutional system." Political institutions are the focus of this book; parties are not the key players in this account.

Mayhew raises a lot of interesting questions that leave open many different avenues for future research. But he often left me wishing for more. For example, he identifies a significant change in the Senate use of the filibuster since the 1980s. Senators used to routinely pass controversial legislation without a filibuster-proof supermajority; in recent decades the chamber has become less majoritarian, employing Senate rules to block high-profile legislative proposals from Democratic and Republican presidents. I wanted Mayhew to explore this and other trends in more depth, offering insights and normative assessments about what these trends might foretell. Researchers with his experience, insight, and credibility have much to teach us.

Those looking for support for theories that Democrats or Republicans have all of the power in Washington will be disappointed. Readers wanting explanation and evidence for why the U.S. Constitution and the political system it established remain robust and vibrant will find many rewards in Mayhew's latest book.

Amy Black is associate professor of politics and international relations at Wheaton College. She is the author most recently of Beyond Left and Right: Helping Christians Make Sense of American Politics (Baker).

Copyright © 2011 Books & Culture. Click for reprint information.